EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26165
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorNapel, Stefanen_US
dc.contributor.authorWidgrén, Mikaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-01-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:16:42Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:16:42Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26165-
dc.description.abstractThe paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the European Parliament and the Council. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate the policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision rules still prevent the Commission from being a Council clone in aggregate. Rather, it is predicted a priori that Commission policies are on average more in accord with the aggregate position of the Parliament than that of the Council. This prediction is confirmed for a data set covering 66 dossiers with 162 controversial EU legislative proposals passed between 1999 and 2002.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2120en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.jelD02en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEuropean Commissionen_US
dc.subject.keywordinvestiture procedureen_US
dc.subject.keywordvoting rulesen_US
dc.subject.keywordCouncil of Ministersen_US
dc.subject.keywordEuropean Parliamenten_US
dc.subject.stwEuropäische Integrationen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleThe European Commission: appointment, preferences, and institutional relationsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn557259800en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
557259800.PDF321.59 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.