Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26165 
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dc.contributor.authorNapel, Stefanen
dc.contributor.authorWidgrén, Mikaen
dc.date.accessioned2008-01-23-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:16:42Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:16:42Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26165-
dc.description.abstractThe paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the European Parliament and the Council. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate the policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision rules still prevent the Commission from being a Council clone in aggregate. Rather, it is predicted a priori that Commission policies are on average more in accord with the aggregate position of the Parliament than that of the Council. This prediction is confirmed for a data set covering 66 dossiers with 162 controversial EU legislative proposals passed between 1999 and 2002.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2120en
dc.subject.jelC70en
dc.subject.jelD02en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEuropean Commissionen
dc.subject.keywordinvestiture procedureen
dc.subject.keywordvoting rulesen
dc.subject.keywordCouncil of Ministersen
dc.subject.keywordEuropean Parliamenten
dc.subject.stwEuropäische Integrationen
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen
dc.titleThe European Commission: appointment, preferences, and institutional relations-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn557259800en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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