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Title:Limited commitment models of the labor market PDF Logo
Authors:Thomas, Jonathan P.
Worrall, Tim
Issue Date:2007
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2109
Abstract:We present an overview of models of long-term self-enforcing labor contracts in which risk sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A base model is developed which is sufficiently general to encompass the two-agent problem central to most of the literature, including variable hours. We consider two-sided limited commitment and look at its implications for aggregate labor market variables. We consider the implications for empirical testing and the available empirical evidence. We also consider the one-sided limited commitment problem for which there exists a considerable amount of empirical support.
JEL:E32
J41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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