Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26154
Authors: 
Thomas, Jonathan P.
Worrall, Tim
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2109
Abstract: 
We present an overview of models of long-term self-enforcing labor contracts in which risk sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A base model is developed which is sufficiently general to encompass the two-agent problem central to most of the literature, including variable hours. We consider two-sided limited commitment and look at its implications for aggregate labor market variables. We consider the implications for empirical testing and the available empirical evidence. We also consider the one-sided limited commitment problem for which there exists a considerable amount of empirical support.
JEL: 
E32
J41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
260.61 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.