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dc.contributor.authorSinn, Hans-Werneren_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-01-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:16:18Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:16:18Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26132-
dc.description.abstractJudged by the principle of intertemporal Pareto optimality, insecure property rights and the greenhouse effect both imply overly rapid extraction of fossil carbon resources. A gradual expansion of demand-reducing public policies – such as increasing ad-valorem taxes on carbon consumption or increasing subsidies for replacement technologies – may exacerbate the problem as it gives resource owners the incentive to avoid future price reductions by anticipating their sales. Useful policies instead involve sequestration, afforestation, stabilization of property rights and emissions trading. Among the public finance measures, constant unit carbon taxes and source taxes on capital income for resource owners stand out.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2087en_US
dc.subject.jelO13en_US
dc.subject.jelQ32en_US
dc.subject.jelQ54en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwKlimaveränderungen_US
dc.subject.stwTreibhausgasen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwAufforstungen_US
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentumsrechten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePublic policies against global warmingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn55593473Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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