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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26121
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Konstantinidis, Nikitas | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2008-01-02 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-28T08:16:11Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-07-28T08:16:11Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2007 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26121 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper introduces a new theoretical framework of international unions qua coalitions of countries adopting a common policy and common supranational institutions. We introduce a general class of non-cooperative spatial bargaining games of coalition formation among three countries in order to examine the endogenous strategic considerations in the creation and enlargement of international unions. Why would we observe a gradualist approach in the formation of the grand coalition even if the latter is assumed to be weakly efficient? We propose uncertainty about the benefits of integration as a mechanism that can generate gradual union formation in equilibrium. As it turns out, it may well be in the core countries interest to delay the accession of a third, peripheral country in order to i) stack the institutional make-up of the initial union in their favor and ii) signal their high resolve to wait out the expansion of their bilateral subunion. A related case from the European Union provides an interesting illustration. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2076 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F53 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wirtschaftsunion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Politische Integration | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Koalition | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verhandlungstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Mehr-Länder-Modell | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Europäische Integration | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Gradualism and uncertainty in international union formation | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 555908445 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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