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dc.contributor.authorKonstantinidis, Nikitasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-01-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:16:11Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:16:11Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26121-
dc.description.abstractThis paper introduces a new theoretical framework of international unions qua coalitions of countries adopting a common policy and common supranational institutions. We introduce a general class of non-cooperative spatial bargaining games of coalition formation among three countries in order to examine the endogenous strategic considerations in the creation and enlargement of international unions. Why would we observe a gradualist approach in the formation of the grand coalition even if the latter is assumed to be weakly efficient? We propose uncertainty about the benefits of integration as a mechanism that can generate gradual union formation in equilibrium. As it turns out, it may well be in the ‘core’ countries’ interest to delay the accession of a third, peripheral country in order to i) stack the institutional make-up of the initial union in their favor and ii) signal their high resolve to wait out the expansion of their bilateral subunion. A related case from the European Union provides an interesting illustration.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2076en_US
dc.subject.jelF53en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftsunionen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Integrationen_US
dc.subject.stwKoalitionen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwMehr-Länder-Modellen_US
dc.subject.stwEuropäische Integrationen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleGradualism and uncertainty in international union formationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn555908445en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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