Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26118
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dc.contributor.authorChoi, Jay Pilen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:16:09Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:16:09Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26118-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the effects of tying arrangements on market competition and social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-homing; that is, they can participate in multiple platforms in order to reap maximal network benefits. The model shows that tying induces more consumers to multi-home and makes platform-specific exclusive contents available to more consumers, which is also beneficial to content providers. As a result, tying can be welfare-enhancing if multi-homing is allowed, even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi-homing. The analysis thus can have important implications for recent antitrust cases in industries where multi-homing is prevalent.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x2073en_US
dc.subject.jelL1en_US
dc.subject.jelL4en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwPrice Bundlingen_US
dc.subject.stwSoftwareen_US
dc.subject.stwNetwork Externalitiesen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleTying in two-sided markets with multi-homingen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn555836088en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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