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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26118
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Choi, Jay Pil | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-12-21 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-28T08:16:09Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-28T08:16:09Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26118 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes the effects of tying arrangements on market competition and social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-homing; that is, they can participate in multiple platforms in order to reap maximal network benefits. The model shows that tying induces more consumers to multi-home and makes platform-specific exclusive contents available to more consumers, which is also beneficial to content providers. As a result, tying can be welfare-enhancing if multi-homing is allowed, even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi-homing. The analysis thus can have important implications for recent antitrust cases in industries where multi-homing is prevalent. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x2073 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L1 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L4 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.stw | Price Bundling | en |
dc.subject.stw | Software | en |
dc.subject.stw | Network Externalities | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wohlfahrtseffekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Tying in two-sided markets with multi-homing | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 555836088 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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