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dc.contributor.authorBlanchard, Emily J.en_US
dc.contributor.authorWillmann, Geralden_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:16:06Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:16:06Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26115-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the dynamics of trade policy reform under democracy. In an overlapping generations model, heterogeneous agents may acquire skills when young, thereby determining the skill composition of their cohort. Current and anticipated trade policies influence education decisions, and thus the identity of the median voter. We show that there may exist two political steady states: one protectionist and one liberal. Transition from the former to the latter can be achieved by government announcements, temporary educational subsidies, or (exogenous) tariff liberalization by trading partners, but not, in general, by transfer payments to adversely affected workers. We find additionally that reform is politically feasible only if the proposed liberalization is sufficiently large, suggesting that radical reform may be necessary for escaping a “protectionist rut.”en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2070en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelE60en_US
dc.subject.jelF13en_US
dc.subject.jelF16en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwAußenhandelsliberalisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwOverlapping Generationsen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePolitical stasis or protectionist rut?: Policy mechanisms for trade reform in a democracyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn555836010en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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