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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26064
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| Title: | | Overprotected politicians  |
| Authors: | | Frey, Bruno S. |
| Issue Date: | | 2007 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper 2019 |
| Abstract: | | This paper argues that politicians are overprotected. The costs of political assassination differ systematically depending on whether a private or a public point of view is taken. A politician attributes a very high (if not infinite) cost to his or her survival. The social cost of political assassination is much smaller as politicians are replaceable. Conversely, the private cost of the security measures is low for politicians, its bulk including time loss and inconvenience is imposed on taxpayers and the general public. The extent of overprotection is larger in dictatorial than in democratic countries. |
| JEL: | | D01 D70 H50 J28 Z10 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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