Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26056
Authors: 
Belleflamme, Paul
Toulemonde, Eric
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2011
Abstract: 
Two types of agents interact on a pre-existing free platform. Agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type. We ask whether a new platform can find fees and subsidies so as to divert agents from the existing platform and make a profit. We show that this might be impossible if intragroup negative externalities are sufficiently (but not too) strong with respect to positive intergroup externalities.
JEL: 
L11
L13
L23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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