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dc.contributor.authorPriks, Mikaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:15:21Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:15:21Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26053-
dc.description.abstractRecent empirical work shows that judicial dependence can explain high levels of corruption. This paper examines how the dependence of judiciaries influences corruption at different levels of the government in a model where the central government, low-level officials, and the judiciary are corrupt. In the model, the central government sells offices to low-level officials and demands ex-post payments enforced by the judiciary. Because an independent judiciary can rule against the central authority and accept bribes from stealing low-level officials, it reduces corruption at the higher level of government but promotes corruption at the lower level. Therefore, even if highly corrupt, an independent judiciary may reduce total corruption. We provide empirical evidence which is in line with this result.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2008en_US
dc.subject.jelH11en_US
dc.subject.jelK40en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwJustizen_US
dc.subject.stwSelbstverwaltungen_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwKonzessionen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleJudiciaries in corrupt societiesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn53829146Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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