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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26051
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Moretto, Michele | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Panteghini, Paolo M. | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2007-07-26 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-28T08:15:20Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-07-28T08:15:20Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2007 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26051 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In this article, we analyse the interactions between financial and start-up decisions in an oligopolistic framework, where firms compete to enter a new market. We show that preemption can substantially reduce the negative effects of credit rationing on start-up investment decisions. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2006 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D92 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G33 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Oligopol | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Unternehmensgründung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Sunk Costs | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Potenzieller Wettbewerb | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kapitalstruktur | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Realoption | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Preemption, start-up decisions and the firms' capital structure | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 538291117 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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