Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26051 
Full metadata record
Appears in Collections:
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMoretto, Micheleen
dc.contributor.authorPanteghini, Paolo M.en
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-26-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:15:20Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:15:20Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26051-
dc.description.abstractIn this article, we analyse the interactions between financial and start-up decisions in an oligopolistic framework, where firms compete to enter a new market. We show that preemption can substantially reduce the negative effects of credit rationing on start-up investment decisions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2006en
dc.subject.jelD92en
dc.subject.jelG33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwOligopolen
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensgründungen
dc.subject.stwSunk Costsen
dc.subject.stwPotenzieller Wettbewerben
dc.subject.stwKapitalstrukturen
dc.subject.stwRealoptionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePreemption, start-up decisions and the firms' capital structure-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn538291117en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
238.66 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.