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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26041
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Amegashie, J. Atsu | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Ouattara, Bazoumana | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Strobl, Eric | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2007-07-25 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-28T08:15:13Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-07-28T08:15:13Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2007 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26041 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | The paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of a donors choice of the composition of unrestricted and in-kind/restricted transfers to a recipient and how this composition is adjusted in response to changes in the moral hazard behavior of the recipient. In-kind or restricted transfers may be used, among others, to control a recipients moral hazard behavior but may be associated with deadweight losses. Within the context of foreign aid, we use a canonical political agency model to construct a simple signaling game between a possibly corrupt politician in a recipient country and a donor to illustrate the donors optimal choice of tied (restricted) and untied foreign aid. We clarify the condition under which a reduction in the recipients moral hazard behavior (i.e., improvement in the level of governance) leads to a fall in the proportion of tied aid. We test the predictions of our theoretical analysis using data on the composition of foreign aid by multilateral and bilateral donors. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 1996 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D73 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F35 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H87 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | I38 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Entwicklungshilfekonditionen | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Internationale Wirtschaftshilfe | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Governance-Ansatz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Moral Hazard | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Moral hazard and the composition of transfers: theory with an application to foreign aid | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 538184124 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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