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dc.contributor.authorRoux, Catherineen_US
dc.contributor.authorvon Ungern-Sternberg, Thomasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:15:12Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:15:12Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26040-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus, influencing firms’ whistle blowing incentives in one market, on their self-reporting decision in another market. Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus are proactive US strategies which aim at triggering multiple confessions by increasing the incentives of already convicted firms to report in another market where they collude. Predictably, conditional on conviction of one cartel, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus strengthen firms’ incentives to report the remaining cartel. However, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus have an ambiguous impact on firms’ incentives to apply for amnesty in the first place: On the one hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may help to sustain a cartel, otherwise reported under the EC policy. On the other hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may induce immediate reporting of both cartels whereas only one of them would have been reported under the EC Leniency Program.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 1995en_US
dc.subject.jelK21en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelL41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwKartellverfahrenen_US
dc.subject.stwStraffreiheiten_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentlichkeitsarbeiten_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleLeniency programs in a multimarket setting: amnesty plus and penalty plusen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn538183543en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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