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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26040
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| Title: | | Leniency programs in a multimarket setting: amnesty plus and penalty plus  |
| Authors: | | Roux, Catherine von Ungern-Sternberg, Thomas |
| Issue Date: | | 2007 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper 1995 |
| Abstract: | | We examine the effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus, influencing firms whistle blowing incentives in one market, on their self-reporting decision in another market. Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus are proactive US strategies which aim at triggering multiple confessions by increasing the incentives of already convicted firms to report in another market where they collude. Predictably, conditional on conviction of one cartel, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus strengthen firms incentives to report the remaining cartel. However, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus have an ambiguous impact on firms incentives to apply for amnesty in the first place: On the one hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may help to sustain a cartel, otherwise reported under the EC policy. On the other hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may induce immediate reporting of both cartels whereas only one of them would have been reported under the EC Leniency Program. |
| JEL: | | K21 K42 L41 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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