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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26025
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Pagano, Marco | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Immordino, Giovanni | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2007-07-25 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-28T08:15:01Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-07-28T08:15:01Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2007 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26025 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We study regulation of the auditing profession in a model where audit quality is unobservable and enforcing regulation is costly. The optimal audit standard falls short of the first-best audit quality, and is increasing in the riskiness of firms and in the amount of funding they seek. The model can encompass collusion between clients and auditors, arising from the joint provision of auditing and consulting services: deflecting collusion requires less ambitious standards. Finally, banning the provision of consulting services by auditors eliminates collusion but may not be optimal in the presence of economies of scope. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 1980 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G28 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | K22 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M42 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wirtschaftsprüferrecht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wirtschaftsprüfung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Informationswert | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Dienstleistungsqualität | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Unternehmensberatung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Rechtsdurchsetzung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Optimal regulation of auditing | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 538175702 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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