Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26025
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dc.contributor.authorPagano, Marcoen_US
dc.contributor.authorImmordino, Giovannien_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:15:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:15:01Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26025-
dc.description.abstractWe study regulation of the auditing profession in a model where audit quality is unobservable and enforcing regulation is costly. The optimal audit standard falls short of the first-best audit quality, and is increasing in the riskiness of firms and in the amount of funding they seek. The model can encompass collusion between clients and auditors, arising from the joint provision of auditing and consulting services: deflecting collusion requires less ambitious standards. Finally, banning the provision of consulting services by auditors eliminates collusion but may not be optimal in the presence of economies of scope.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x1980en_US
dc.subject.jelG28en_US
dc.subject.jelK22en_US
dc.subject.jelM42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftsprüferrechten_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftsprüfungen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationswerten_US
dc.subject.stwDienstleistungsqualitäten_US
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensberatungen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsbeschränkungen_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOptimal regulation of auditingen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn538175702en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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