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dc.contributor.authorRedoano, Michelaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:14:40Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:14:40Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25997-
dc.description.abstractWe use a panel of European countries to investigate whether or not governments interact with their neighbors when they decide their fiscal policy; we consider both taxes and expenditures, at aggregate and at separate aspects of policy. We analyse possible different competitive behaviours and find evidence of fiscal interdependencies consistently with the literature on tax and yardstick competition. For corporate taxes, the regression results suggest that European countries follow large countries in order to attract capital; for income taxes and public expenditures, instead, fiscal interactions exist but they are mainly due to yardstick competition. Finally, we have found the countries are interdependent with each others before joining the EU, and than, once they are in, they become more independent.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 1952en_US
dc.subject.jelH2en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.jelH87en_US
dc.subject.jelD7en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Finanzplanungen_US
dc.subject.stwSteueraufkommenen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleFiscal interactions among European countries.: does the EU Matter?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn538089539en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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