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dc.contributor.authorGanslandt, Mattiasen
dc.contributor.authorMaskus, Keith E.en
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-24-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:14:40Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:14:40Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25996-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a model of vertical pricing in which an original manufacturer sets wholesale prices in two markets integrated at the distributor level by parallel imports (PI). In this context we show that if competition policy requires uniform wholesale prices across locations it would push retail prices toward convergence as transportation costs fall. However, these retail prices could be higher than those induced without restrictions on prices charged to distributors. Thus, the competition policy may not be optimal for consumer welfare.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1951en
dc.subject.jelF15en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.jelK21en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwParallelimporten
dc.subject.stwMarktintegrationen
dc.subject.stwPreisdifferenzierungen
dc.subject.stwVertikale Konzentrationen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbspolitiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleWholesale price discrimination and parallel imports-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn538088818en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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