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dc.contributor.authorSchaltegger, Christoph A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorFeld, Lars P.en_US
dc.description.abstractA common political claim is that decentralized governments undermine policy makers’ ability to fight fiscal imbalance. This paper examines how different fiscal institutions influence the likelihood of a successful fiscal adjustment. Using a panel of the Swiss cantons from 1981 to 2001, we first analyze the episodes of tight fiscal policy and their macroeconomic consequences. Then, we empirically investigate the determinants of successful long-lasting deficit reductions. Contrary to the popular claim, we find that fiscal decentralization increases the probability of a successful fiscal consolidation. In addition, the results point to an important role of intergovernmental grants and the circumstances, in particular the size of fiscal imbalance in the years before the consolidation in determining a successful adjustment policy. Furthermore, coalition governments and large parliaments less likely implement successful fiscal stabilizations. Finally, there is some weak evidence that spending cuts are more promising in reaching a long-lasting fiscal adjustment than revenue increases.en_US
dc.publisherCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) Munichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 1946en_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal adjustmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordconsolidation policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal decentralizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal institutionsen_US
dc.titleAre fiscal adjustments less successful in decentralized governments?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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