Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25972 
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dc.contributor.authorForos, Øysteinen
dc.contributor.authorHagen, Kåre P.en
dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarleen
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-23-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:14:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:14:22Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25972-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we show how an upstream firm can prevent destructive competition among downstream firms producing relatively close substitutes by implementing a price-dependent profit-sharing rule. The rule also ensures that the downstream firms undertake investments which benefit the industry in aggregate. The model is consistent with observations from the market for content commodities distributed by mobile networks.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1927en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelL22en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordprofit-sharingen
dc.subject.keywordvertical restraintsen
dc.subject.keywordinvestmentsen
dc.subject.keywordcompetitionen
dc.subject.stwDuopolen
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommener Wettbewerben
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTelekommunikationen
dc.subject.stwNorwegenen
dc.titlePrice-dependent profit sharing as an escape from the Bertrand paradox-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn538035129en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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