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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2596
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Fehn, Rainer | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Meier, Carsten-Patrick | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T14:29:47Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T14:29:47Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2001 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2596 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Some countries especially in continental Europe exhibit a corporatist politicoeconomic equilibrium with a sustantial protection of insiders on both markets. The more important money is in political decision-making, the more devided the workface is, and the more globalized capital markets are, the more likely is a capitalist politicoeconomic equilibrium with little employment and substantial investor protection. Our prediction of a negative cross-country relationship between labor market rigidities and of competition on capital markets receives considerable empicical support. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo GmbH München | | - |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper series 456 | | - |
| dc.subject.jel | | G34 | | - |
| dc.subject.jel | | K22 | | - |
| dc.subject.jel | | K42 | | - |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | - |
| dc.subject.keyword | | labor markets | | - |
| dc.subject.keyword | | employment protection | | - |
| dc.subject.keyword | | corporatism | | - |
| dc.subject.keyword | | corporate governance | | - |
| dc.subject.keyword | | shareholder protection | | - |
| dc.subject.keyword | | political economy | | - |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitsmarktflexibilisierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Korporatismus | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Public Choice | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitsrecht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Aktienrecht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Corporate Governance | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Insider-Outsider-Modell | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Schätzung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Welt | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The positive economics of labor market rigidities and investor protection | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 331662418 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des IfW Economists Online CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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