EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2596
  
Title:The positive economics of labor market rigidities and investor protection PDF Logo
Authors:Fehn, Rainer
Meier, Carsten-Patrick
Issue Date:2001
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper series 456
Abstract:This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Some countries especially in continental Europe exhibit a corporatist politicoeconomic equilibrium with a sustantial protection of insiders on both markets. The more important money is in political decision-making, the more devided the workface is, and the more globalized capital markets are, the more likely is a capitalist politicoeconomic equilibrium with little employment and substantial investor protection. Our prediction of a negative cross-country relationship between labor market rigidities and of competition on capital markets receives considerable empicical support.
Subjects:labor markets
employment protection
corporatism
corporate governance
shareholder protection
political economy
JEL:G34
K22
K42
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des IfW

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
331662418.pdf131.71 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2596

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.