EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25955
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHagen, Rune Jansenen_US
dc.contributor.authorTorsvik, Gauteen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:14:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:14:10Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25955-
dc.description.abstractWe study a model where two parties, one from the left and one from the right, compete for position. The election is to be held in the near future and the outcome is uncertain. Prior to the election, the members of both parties nominate their prime ministerial candidates. Investors care about the outcome since they may invest in irreversible domestic production capital. We find that there is political convergence in the nomination process. In some circumstances, it is only the median voter of the left-wing party that elects a more moderate candidate. In other instances, the members of both parties nominate more “conservative” candidates, but there is still convergence. We also show that a higher probability of the left winning the election increases the degree of convergence, while a more globalised economy (greater capital mobility) reduces it.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 1910en_US
dc.subject.jelE61en_US
dc.subject.jelF21en_US
dc.subject.jelH24en_US
dc.subject.jelP16en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Parteien_US
dc.subject.stwPolitisches Zielen_US
dc.titleIrreversible investments, dynamic inconsistency and policy convergenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn538026227en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
538026227.PDF308.84 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.