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dc.contributor.authorPezzin, Liliana E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPollak, Robert A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSchone, Barbara S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:14:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:14:08Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25953-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we use a two-stage bargaining model to analyze the living arrangement of a disabled elderly parent and the assistance provided to the parent by her adult children. The first stage determines the living arrangement: the parent can live in a nursing home, live alone in the community, or live with any child who has invited coresidence. The second stage determines the assistance provided by each child in the family. Working by backward induction, we first calculate the level of assistance that each child would provide to the parent in each possible living arrangement. Using these calculations, we then analyze the living arrangement that would emerge from the first stage game. A key assumption of our model is that family members cannot or will not make binding agreements at the first stage regarding transfers at the second stage. Because coresidence is likely to reduce the bargaining power of the coresident child relative to her siblings, coresidence may fail to emerge as the equilibrium living arrangement even when it is Pareto efficient. That is, the outcome of the two-stage game need not be Pareto efficient.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 1908en_US
dc.subject.jelD1en_US
dc.subject.jelJ1en_US
dc.subject.jelJ2en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwFamilienökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwGenerationenbeziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwKinderen_US
dc.subject.stwBehinderteen_US
dc.subject.stwPflegediensten_US
dc.subject.stwAltenheimen_US
dc.subject.stwPareto-Optimumen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleEfficiency in family bargaining: living arrangements and caregiving decisions of adult children and disabled elderly parentsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn53802481Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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