Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25917
Authors: 
Gersbach, Hans
Pachl, Bernhard
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 1872
Abstract: 
We consider a collective choice process where three players make proposals sequentially on how to divide a given quantity of resources. Afterwards, one of the proposals is chosen by majority decision. If no proposal obtains a majority, a proposal is drawn by lot. We establish the existence of the set of subgame perfect equilibria, using a suitable refinement concept. In any equilibrium, the first agent offers the whole cake to the second proposal-maker, who in turn offers the whole cake back to the first agent. The third agent is then indifferent about dividing the cake between himself and the first or the second agent.
JEL: 
C72
D30
D39
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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