Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25917
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dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen_US
dc.contributor.authorPachl, Bernharden_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:13:41Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:13:41Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25917-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a collective choice process where three players make proposals sequentially on how to divide a given quantity of resources. Afterwards, one of the proposals is chosen by majority decision. If no proposal obtains a majority, a proposal is drawn by lot. We establish the existence of the set of subgame perfect equilibria, using a suitable refinement concept. In any equilibrium, the first agent offers the whole cake to the second proposal-maker, who in turn offers the whole cake back to the first agent. The third agent is then indifferent about dividing the cake between himself and the first or the second agent.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x1872en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD30en_US
dc.subject.jelD39en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleCake division by majority decisionen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn528740288en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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