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dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarleen_US
dc.contributor.authorKoethenbuerger, Markoen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttormen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:13:41Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:13:41Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25916-
dc.description.abstractTwo-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known textbook result in one-sided markets is that a government may increase a monopolist's output and reduce the deadweight loss by subsidizing output. The present paper shows that this result need not hold in a two-sided market. On the contrary, a higher ad-valorem tax rate - rather than a subsidy - could increase output and enhance welfare.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 1871en_US
dc.subject.jelD4en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH22en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleTaxation in two-sided marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn528739409en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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