Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25913
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dc.contributor.authorEichner, Thomasen_US
dc.contributor.authorRunkel, Marcoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:13:38Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:13:38Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25913-
dc.description.abstractWithin a two-country model with involuntary unemployment, this paper investigates corporate income taxation under separate accounting versus formula apportionment. In contrast to separate accounting, under formula apportionment the corporate tax policy causes a fiscal externality which goes back to unemployment. This unemployment externality is the lowest when the apportionment formula does not contain a payroll factor. It tends to compensate other externalities such that tax rates become inefficiently low. In an empirical calibration, we show that the transition from separate accounting to formula apportionment improves welfare and reduces unemployment. The welfare increase is the strongest under a pure sales formula.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x1868en_US
dc.subject.jelH25en_US
dc.subject.jelH71en_US
dc.subject.jelJ60en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleCorporate income taxation of multinationals and unemploymenten_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn528729845en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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