Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25910 
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dc.contributor.authorKotsogiannis, Christosen
dc.contributor.authorSchwager, Roberten
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-10-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:13:36Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:13:36Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25910-
dc.description.abstractA multi-jurisdictional system is thought to improve, through yardstick competition, accountability. At the same time equalization programs, a common feature of multijurisdictional systems, are thought to be a prerequisite for both efficiency of the internal market and the equity objective of the equal treatment of equals. This paper shows that such programs, by reducing the information context of comparisons across jurisdictions, introduce perverse fiscal incentives and thus reduce accountability. The consequence of this is that equilibrium rent-taking increases with the intensity of equalization transfers.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1865en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleFiscal equalization and yardstick competition-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn528727052en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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