Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25910
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dc.contributor.authorKotsogiannis, Christosen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchwager, Roberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:13:36Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:13:36Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25910-
dc.description.abstractA multi-jurisdictional system is thought to improve, through yardstick competition, accountability. At the same time equalization programs, a common feature of multijurisdictional systems, are thought to be a prerequisite for both efficiency of the internal market and the equity objective of the equal treatment of equals. This paper shows that such programs, by reducing the information context of comparisons across jurisdictions, introduce perverse fiscal incentives and thus reduce accountability. The consequence of this is that equilibrium rent-taking increases with the intensity of equalization transfers.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x1865en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleFiscal equalization and yardstick competitionen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn528727052en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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