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dc.contributor.authorGérard, Marcelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:13:33Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:13:33Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25905-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates replacing separate taxation by consolidation and formulary apportionment in a Bottom-up Federation, when a multijurisdictional firm is mobile in various respects. The reform is decided cooperatively by all the jurisdictions or by some of them, while tax rates remain within the competence of each jurisdiction. The paper sets forth the conditions for the reform to be social welfare enhancing, while not increasing tax competition. Among them, the formula should emphasize criteria that the Multijurisdictional Enterprise cannot easily manipulate and the consolidating area should protect its capacity to levy taxes by adopting a crediting system, possibly extended to accrued capital gains, vis-àvis the rest of the world. Policy conclusions are suggested accordingly.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 1860en_US
dc.subject.jelH32en_US
dc.subject.jelH73en_US
dc.subject.jelH87en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensbesteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerreformen_US
dc.subject.stwMultinationales Unternehmenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleReforming the taxation of multijurisdictional enterprises in Europe: coopetition in a bottom-up federationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn528718398en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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