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dc.contributor.authorAnderlini, Lucaen_US
dc.contributor.authorFelli, Leonardoen_US
dc.contributor.authorPostlewaite, Andrewen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-09en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:13:27Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:13:27Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25897-
dc.description.abstractWe describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without it. The institutional role of the court is to maximize the parties’ welfare under a veil of ignorance. In Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) the possibility of “menu contracts” between the informed buyer and the uninformed seller is described but not analyzed. Here, we fully analyze this case. We find that if we maintain the assumption that one of the potential objects of trade is not contractible exante, the results of Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) survive intact. If however we let all “widgets” be contractible ex-ante, then multiple equilibria obtain. In this case the role for an active court is to ensure the inefficient pooling equilibria do not exist alongside the superior ones in which separation occurs.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 1852en_US
dc.subject.jelC79en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelD89en_US
dc.subject.jelK40en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleActive courts and menu contractsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn528601881en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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