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dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen_US
dc.contributor.authorSturm, Jan-Egberten_US
dc.contributor.authorVreeland, James Raymonden_US
dc.description.abstractWe investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, using panel data for 191 countries over the period 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional and country effects, and duration dependence. There is also evidence that UNSC membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. The size of the loan, however, is not affected by UNSC membership.en_US
dc.publisherCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) Munichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 1808en_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Organisationen_US
dc.subject.stwAnpassungsprogramm des IWFen_US
dc.titleDoes membership on the UN security council influence IMF decisions?: evidence from panel dataen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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