Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25847
Authors: 
Buchholz, Wolfgang
Cornes, Richard
Peters, Wolfgang
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 1802
Abstract: 
We present a rigorous, yet elementary, demonstration of the existence of a unique Lindahl equilibrium under the assumptions that characterize the standard n-player public good model. Indeed, our approach, which exploits the aggregative structure of the public good model, lends itself to a transparent geometric representation. Moreover, it can handle the more general concept of the cost-share or ratio equilibrium. Finally, we indicate how it may be exploited to facilitate comparative static analysis of Lindahl and cost share equilibria.
JEL: 
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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