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dc.contributor.authorGoerke, Laszloen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:12:36Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:12:36Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25826-
dc.description.abstractDecisions by firms and individuals on the extent of their tax payments have generally been treated as separate choices. Empirically, a positive relationship between corporate and personal income tax evasion can be observed. The theoretical analysis in this paper shows that a manager's decision on the firm's behaviour will be independent of his personal preferences if the gain from reducing corporate tax payments is certain, as in the case of tax avoidance. If, however, the firm evades taxes so that the manager's income depends on whether the firm's activities are detected or not, corporate and personal income tax evasion choices cannot be separated.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 1781en_US
dc.subject.jelH24en_US
dc.subject.jelH25en_US
dc.subject.jelH26en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleCorporate and personal income tax declarationsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn517032147en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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