Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25819
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dc.contributor.authorEdwards, Jeremy S. S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorEggert, Wolfgangen_US
dc.contributor.authorWeichenrieder, Alfons J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:12:31Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:12:31Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25819-
dc.description.abstractThis paper uses German evidence to address two questions about corporate governance. The effects of ownership on corporate governance have received much recent attention, but very little of this has been devoted to the appropriate way to measure firm ownership. The results of this paper show that the conclusions reached about the effects of ownership on corporate governance can depend critically on the particular ownership measure used, and that the widely-used weakest-link principle is wholly unsatisfactory as a means of dealing with the issues raised by pyramid ownership structures. The paper also shows that greater ownership concentration typically weakens the link between managerial pay and firm profitability. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis, emphasised in the recent literature on the USA, that large owners are a complement to, rather than a substitute for, such a link.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x1774en_US
dc.subject.jelG32en_US
dc.subject.jelL25en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleThe measurement of firm ownership and its effect on managerial payen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn517029162en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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