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dc.contributor.authorHainz, Christaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:12:23Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:12:23Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25808-
dc.description.abstractBusiness groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliated firms. One explanation is that business groups substitute some functions of missing institutions, for example, enforcing contracts. We investigate this by setting up a model where firms within the business group are connected to each other by a vertical production structure and an internal capital market. Thus, the business group’s organizational mode and the financial structure allow a self-enforcing contract to be designed. Our model of a business group shows that only sequential investments can solve the ex post moral hazard problem. We also find that firms may prefer not to integrate.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 1763en_US
dc.subject.jelG31en_US
dc.subject.jelG32en_US
dc.subject.jelG34en_US
dc.subject.jelK49en_US
dc.subject.jelL22en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwKonzernen_US
dc.subject.stwVertragen_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwMarktversagenen_US
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleBusiness groups in emerging markets: financial control and sequential investmenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn517021684en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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