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dc.contributor.authorDur, Roberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:12:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:12:22Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25807-
dc.description.abstractThis paper offers a new argument for why a more aggressive enforcement of minor offenses (‘zero-tolerance’) may yield a double dividend in that it reduces both minor offenses and more severe crime. We develop a model of criminal subcultures in which people gain social status among their peers for being ‘tough’ by committing criminal acts. As zero-tolerance keeps relatively ‘gutless’ people from committing a minor offense, the signaling value of that action increases, which makes it attractive for some people who would otherwise commit more severe crime. If social status is sufficiently important in criminal subcultures, zerotolerance reduces crime across the board.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 1762en_US
dc.subject.jelK14en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleStatus-seeking in criminal subcultures and the double dividend of zero-toleranceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn51701890Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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