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dc.contributor.authorAmegashie, J. Atsuen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:12:19Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:12:19Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25802-
dc.description.abstractIn psychological games, higher-order beliefs, emotions, and motives - in addition to actions - affect players’ payoffs. Suppose you are tolerated as opposed to being genuinely accepted by your peers and “friends”. In particular, suppose you are invited to a party, movie, dinner, etc not because your company is desired but because the inviter would feel guilty if she did not invite you. In all of these cases, it is conceivable that the intention behind the action will matter and hence will affect your payoffs. I model intentions in a dynamic psychological game under incomplete information. I find a complex social interaction in this game. In particular, a player may stick to a strategy of accepting every invitation with the goal of discouraging insincere invitations. This may lead one to erroneously infer that this player is eagerly waiting for an invitation, when indeed his behavior is driven more by strategic considerations than by an excessive desire for social acceptance. I discuss how being tolerated but not being truly accepted can explain the rejection of mutually beneficial trades, the choice of identity, social exclusion, marital divorce, and its implication for political correctness and affirmative action.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 1757en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelJ16en_US
dc.subject.jelZ13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleIntentions and social interactionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn517016052en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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