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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25799
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Koethenbuerger, Marko | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2006-09-06 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-28T08:12:17Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-07-28T08:12:17Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2006 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25799 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper analyzes whether changes in the timing of equalizing transfers to state governments necessitate an adjustment in federal corrective policy. According to the existing literature (assuming an ex-ante choice of transfers), the corrective grant is equal to the marginal damage/benefit inflicted by externality generation. When the federal government accommodates state finances ex-post, the grant differs in formula from existing prescription. Allocative federal policy corrects state policy incentives twofold. It entails a correction for the distortion in the marginal benefit of state spending (as in earlier literature) and for the distortion in the marginal cost of public funds induced by the ex-post provision of transfers. The required grant rule is generically disproportionate to the equilibrium externality (even with lump-sum taxation). Furthermore, the ex-post provision of transfers is critical for the nature of the equilibrium inefficiency. Equalizing transfers at least partly internalize consumption spill-overs, but simultaneously establishes a new source of inefficiency. As a final result, the existing prescription for allocative federal policy continues to apply if the public good is pure. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 1754 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H7 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D62 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H3 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H1 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Ex-post redistribution in a federation: implications for corrective policy | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 517015234 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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