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dc.contributor.authorMacLeod, W. Bentleyen
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-05-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:11:59Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:11:59Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25775-
dc.description.abstractThis paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)), have been offered as solutions to the problem of enforcing an incomplete contract. It is shown that the efficiency of these solutions is very sensitive to the characteristics of the good or service exchanged. In general, neither the repeat purchase mechanism nor efficiency wages is the most efficient in the set of possible relational contracts. In many situations, total output may be increased through the use of performance pay and through increasing the quality of law.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1730en
dc.subject.jelD86en
dc.subject.jelK12en
dc.subject.jelC7en
dc.subject.jelO17en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen
dc.subject.stwPrestigeen
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleReputations, relationships and the enforcement of incomplete contracts-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn516993402en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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