Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25775
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dc.contributor.authorMacLeod, W. Bentleyen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:11:59Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:11:59Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25775-
dc.description.abstractThis paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)), have been offered as solutions to the problem of enforcing an incomplete contract. It is shown that the efficiency of these solutions is very sensitive to the characteristics of the good or service exchanged. In general, neither the repeat purchase mechanism nor efficiency wages is the most efficient in the set of possible relational contracts. In many situations, total output may be increased through the use of performance pay and through increasing the quality of law.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x1730en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.jelK12en_US
dc.subject.jelC7en_US
dc.subject.jelO17en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen_US
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwPrestigeen_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleReputations, relationships and the enforcement of incomplete contractsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn516993402en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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