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dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen
dc.contributor.authorSturm, Jan-Egberten
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-05-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:11:55Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:11:55Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25769-
dc.description.abstractUsing panel data for 188 countries over the period 1970-2002 this paper empirically analyzes the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment programs and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the US, World Bank (concessional and non-concessional) loans have a significant impact, while the IMF has not. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and method of estimation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1724en
dc.subject.jelF33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwAnpassungsprogramm des IWFen
dc.subject.stwInternationaler Krediten
dc.subject.stwPanelen
dc.titleDo IMF and World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn516984128en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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