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dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen_US
dc.contributor.authorSturm, Jan-Egberten_US
dc.description.abstractUsing panel data for 188 countries over the period 1970-2002 this paper empirically analyzes the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment programs and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the US, World Bank (concessional and non-concessional) loans have a significant impact, while the IMF has not. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and method of estimation.en_US
dc.publisherCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) Munichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 1724en_US
dc.subject.stwAnpassungsprogramm des IWFen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationaler Krediten_US
dc.titleDo IMF and World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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