Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25769
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen_US
dc.contributor.authorSturm, Jan-Egberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:11:55Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:11:55Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25769-
dc.description.abstractUsing panel data for 188 countries over the period 1970-2002 this paper empirically analyzes the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment programs and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the US, World Bank (concessional and non-concessional) loans have a significant impact, while the IMF has not. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and method of estimation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x1724en_US
dc.subject.jelF33en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwAnpassungsprogramm des IWFen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationaler Krediten_US
dc.subject.stwPanelen_US
dc.titleDo IMF and World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?en_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn516984128en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
358.09 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.