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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25769
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Dreher, Axel | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Sturm, Jan-Egbert | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2006-09-05 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-28T08:11:55Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-07-28T08:11:55Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2006 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25769 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Using panel data for 188 countries over the period 1970-2002 this paper empirically analyzes the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment programs and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the US, World Bank (concessional and non-concessional) loans have a significant impact, while the IMF has not. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and method of estimation. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 1724 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F33 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wahlverhalten | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Anpassungsprogramm des IWF | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Internationaler Kredit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Panel | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Do IMF and World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly? | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 516984128 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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