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dc.contributor.authorEncaoua, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorLefouili, Yassineen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:11:48Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:11:48Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25760-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the choice of an intellectual protection regime for a process innovation. We set up a multi-stage model in which choosing between patent and trade secrecy is affected by three parameters : the patent strength defined as the probability that the right is upheld by the court, the cost of imitating a patented innovation relative to the cost of imitating a secret innovation, and the innovation size defined as the extent of the cost reduction. The choice of the protection regime is the result of two effects: the damage effect evaluated under the unjust enrichment doctrine and the effect of market competition that occurs under the shadow of infringement. We find that large innovations are likely to be kept secret whereas small innovations are always patented. Furthermore, medium innovations are patented only when patent strength is sufficiently high. Finally, we investigate a class of licensing agreements used to settle patent disputes between patent holders and their competitors.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 1715en_US
dc.subject.jelD45en_US
dc.subject.jelL10en_US
dc.subject.jelO32en_US
dc.subject.jelO34en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleChoosing intellectual protection: imitation, patent strength and licensingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn516980742en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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