Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25747 
Full metadata record
Appears in Collections:
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSchindler, Dirken
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttormen
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-04-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:11:38Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:11:38Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25747-
dc.description.abstractWe study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society's point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1702en
dc.subject.jelH87en
dc.subject.jelL1en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensbesteuerungen
dc.subject.stwSteuerbemessungen
dc.subject.stwSteuerharmonisierungen
dc.subject.stwMultinationales Unternehmenen
dc.subject.stwSteuerwirkungen
dc.subject.stwKartellen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCompany tax reform in Europe and its effect on collusive behavior-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn516950932en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
327.13 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.