EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25747
  
Title:Company tax reform in Europe and its effect on collusive behavior PDF Logo
Authors:Schindler, Dirk
Schjelderup, Guttorm
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 1702
Abstract:We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society’s point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.
JEL:H87
L1
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
516950932.PDF327.13 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25747

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.