Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25747 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1702
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society's point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.
JEL: 
H87
L1
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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