Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25739
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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-30en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:40:50Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:40:50Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25739-
dc.description.abstractSimilar to welfare economics where with(out) interpersonal comparisons one defines unique (set-valued) welfare (Pareto) optima, we present a framework for one-person decision making where with(out) a prior probability distribution individual optimality prescribes usually a unique (set of) choice(s). Satisfiable aspirations in the sense that there exists some choice guaranteeing them define a much larger choice set whose intersection with the set of prior-free optimal choices is never empty. We also review experimental procedures and results which incentivize aspiration formation and reject even prior-free optimality experimentally.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniversität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik|cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers|x2008,055en_US
dc.subject.jelB4en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.jelD10en_US
dc.subject.keywordSatisficingen_US
dc.subject.keywordbounded rationalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimalityen_US
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Rationalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidungen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titlePrior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementationen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn572968353en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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