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dc.contributor.authorGeorg, Sebastianen_US
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.contributor.authorWalkowitz, Garien_US
dc.contributor.authorWeiland, Torstenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-03-28en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:40:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:40:22Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25702-
dc.description.abstractDoes geographic or (perceived) social distance between subjects significantly affect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question, subjects once play an ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and dummy player) and asymmetric information (only the proposer knows what can be distributed). Treatments differ in their geographical scope in that they involve either one or three subject pools which, in the latter case, structurally differ in their between-subject pool heterogeneity. Observed choice behavior corroborates several stylized facts of this class of ultimatum games which are primarily explained by strategic play and otherregarding preferences. While the extent of self-interested allocation behavior in proposers significantly varies across sites, neither proposers nor responders meaningfully condition their choices on their co-players’ provenance or affiliation. Altogether, we do not discern articulate discriminative behavior based on geographic or social distance.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniversität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2008,028en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.keywordEquityen_US
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordultimatum bargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcross-national experimenten_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwMultikulturellen_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleDistributive fairness in an intercultural ultimatum gameen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn560542453en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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