Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25702 
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dc.contributor.authorGeorg, Sebastianen
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren
dc.contributor.authorWalkowitz, Garien
dc.contributor.authorWeiland, Torstenen
dc.date.accessioned2008-03-28-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:40:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:40:22Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25702-
dc.description.abstractDoes geographic or (perceived) social distance between subjects significantly affect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question, subjects once play an ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and dummy player) and asymmetric information (only the proposer knows what can be distributed). Treatments differ in their geographical scope in that they involve either one or three subject pools which, in the latter case, structurally differ in their between-subject pool heterogeneity. Observed choice behavior corroborates several stylized facts of this class of ultimatum games which are primarily explained by strategic play and otherregarding preferences. While the extent of self-interested allocation behavior in proposers significantly varies across sites, neither proposers nor responders meaningfully condition their choices on their co-players’ provenance or affiliation. Altogether, we do not discern articulate discriminative behavior based on geographic or social distance.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2008,028en
dc.subject.jelC70en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEquityen
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen
dc.subject.keywordsocial preferencesen
dc.subject.keywordultimatum bargainingen
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen
dc.subject.keywordcross-national experimenten
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwMultikulturellen
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleDistributive fairness in an intercultural ultimatum game-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn560542453en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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