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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25685
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| Title: | | Effects of profitable downsizing on collective bargaining  |
| Authors: | | Fischer, Sven Güth, Werner Köhler, Christoph |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Jena economic research papers 2008,011 |
| Abstract: | | We experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decision of the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude one of two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responder acceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one of them, what increases the available pie, and in case he doesnt exclude him despite strong monetary incentives. We find that on the aggregate level the proposers decision has no effect on acceptance thresholds. However, if the proposer excludes one responder, the distribution of thresholds becomes bimodal, indicating a polarization in behavior. |
| Subjects: | | bargaining experiment labor markets |
| JEL: | | C91 J52 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik
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