Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25685
Authors: 
Fischer, Sven
Güth, Werner
Köhler, Christoph
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2008,011
Abstract: 
We experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decision of the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude one of two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responder acceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one of them, what increases the available pie, and in case he doesn’t exclude him despite strong monetary incentives. We find that on the aggregate level the proposer’s decision has no effect on acceptance thresholds. However, if the proposer excludes one responder, the distribution of thresholds becomes bimodal, indicating a polarization in behavior.
Subjects: 
bargaining
experiment
labor markets
JEL: 
C91
J52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
500.18 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.