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Title:Planning ahead: eliciting intentions and beliefs in a public goods game PDF Logo
Authors:González, Luis G.
Levati, Maria Vittoria
Issue Date:2007
Series/Report no.:Jena economic research papers 2007,104
Abstract:In a two-person ¯nitely repeated public goods experiment, we use intentions data to interpret individual behavior. Based on a random-utility model speci¯cation, we develop a relationship between a player's beliefs about others' behavior and his contributions' plans, and use this relationship to identify the player's most likely preference \type. Our estimation analysis indicates that players are heterogeneous in their preferences also at the intentional level. Moreover, our data show that deviations from intended actions are positively related to changes in beliefs, thereby suggesting that people are able to plan.
Subjects:Public goods games
Latent-class logit
Conditional cooperation
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers (2007-2014), Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik und Universität Jena

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