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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25683
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| Title: | | Planning ahead: eliciting intentions and beliefs in a public goods game  |
| Authors: | | González, Luis G. Levati, Maria Vittoria |
| Issue Date: | | 2007 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Jena economic research papers 2007,104 |
| Abstract: | | In a two-person ¯nitely repeated public goods experiment, we use intentions data to interpret individual behavior. Based on a random-utility model speci¯cation, we develop a relationship between a player's beliefs about others' behavior and his contributions' plans, and use this relationship to identify the player's most likely preference \type. Our estimation analysis indicates that players are heterogeneous in their preferences also at the intentional level. Moreover, our data show that deviations from intended actions are positively related to changes in beliefs, thereby suggesting that people are able to plan. |
| Subjects: | | Public goods games Experiments Latent-class logit Conditional cooperation |
| JEL: | | C70 C72 C92 H41 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik
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