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dc.contributor.authorAudretsch, David B.en_US
dc.contributor.authorLehmann, Erik E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPlummer, Lawrence A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-03-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:39:58Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:39:58Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25671-
dc.description.abstractAn important literature has made a fundamental link between corporate governance and corporate strategy. According to agency theory, assigning managers stock options aligns their interests with the interests of the owners of the firm. This paper suggests that this may not apply in the context of new ventures. Instead, an alternative perspective offered in this paper suggests that if contracts are incomplete, then managerial stock ownership not only provides a mechanism to align managerial incentives with the owners’ goals, as agency theory predicts, it also grants top managers residual control rights to be used in subsequent negotiations with the owners. The ability to exercise residual control rights improves the ex post bargaining position of the CEO as an asset owner, thereby increasing her incentive to make relationship-specific investments that are specific to the new venture. Thus, in the context of new venture strategy assigning asset ownership to those who have the most important relationshipspecific resources or who have indispensable human capital is a crucial source of subsequent competitive advantage. This theory of entrepreneurial governance is tested using patent ownership as a proxy for both relationshipspecific investments and indispensable human capital of the CEO of the new venture. The empirical results support the main hypothesis posited by the entrepreneurial governance model.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniversität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2007,086en_US
dc.subject.jelM13en_US
dc.subject.jelL20en_US
dc.subject.jelR30en_US
dc.subject.keywordmanagerial equity ownershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordnew venturesen_US
dc.subject.keywordproperty rightsen_US
dc.subject.keywordgovernanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordknowledgeen_US
dc.subject.keywordinnovationen_US
dc.subject.stwInnovationen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsstrategieen_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensgründungen_US
dc.subject.stwWertpapieremissionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleCreating strategic advantage through entrepreneurial governance in new venturesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn559547722en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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