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dc.contributor.authorAvrahami, Judithen_US
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.contributor.authorKareev, Yaakoven_US
dc.contributor.authorUske, Tobiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-13en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:39:51Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:39:51Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25662-
dc.description.abstractWhen two or more agents compete for a bonus and the agents' productivity in each of several possible occurrences depends stochastically on (constant) effort, the number of times that are checked to assign the bonus affects the level of un-certainty in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn, is expected to increase the efforts made by competing agents (Cowen and Glazer (1996), Dubey and Hai-manko (2003), Dubey and Wu ( 2001)). Theoretical predictions were derived and experimental evidence collected for the case of two competing agents, with the bonus awarded to that agent who outperforms the other. Levels of uncertainty (sampling occasions of productions, 1 or 3), cost of production (high or low), cost symmetry (asymmetric or symmetric), and piece-rate reward were manipulated factorially to test the robustness of the effects of uncertainty. For control, a sin-gle-agent case was also theoretically analyzed and empirically tested. The re-sults indicate that, for tournaments, greater uncertainty does indeed lead to greater than expected effort and lower unit variable costs.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniversität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2007,093en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelM42en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelM55en_US
dc.subject.keywordMonitoringen_US
dc.subject.keywordTournamenten_US
dc.subject.keywordIncentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordUncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordStochastic Production Technologyen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungskontrolleen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleOn the incentive effects of uncertainty in monitoring agents: a theoretical and experimental analysisen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn55407043Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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